The Effects Of The Refugee Crisis On The EU-Turkey Relations: The Readmission Agreement And Beyond by Bal, Pinar Gedikkaya
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
14 
The Effects Of The Refugee Crisis On The EU-Turkey 
Relations: The Readmission Agreement And Beyond 
 
 
 
Pinar Gedikkaya Bal, Assistant Prof. 
Beykent University, Turkey 
 
doi: 10.19044/esj.2016.v12n8p14    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n8p14 
 
Abstract  
 The recent refugee crisis has created a new momentum in the EU-
Turkey relations which have been going through an impasse in the last 
couple of years. With the latest EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, the 
European Union’s promise of visa liberalization, financial aid as well as the 
opening of a new chapter in accession negotiations, it has become possible to 
talk about a rapprochement between the two parties. This paper aims to 
examine the effects of the refugee crisis on the EU-Turkey relations in the 
light of these recent developments. The paper also aims to analyze the 
possibility of further cooperation and improvement of relations between the 
two parties as a result of this rapprochement. 
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Introduction 
 With the massive influx of migrants to Europe that has reached 
alarming numbers in 2015, Europe has been witnessing one of the biggest 
refugee crisis since the Second World War. The terrorist attacks in Paris in 
November 2015 have exacerbated this crisis further.  As the doubts about the 
European Union’s (EU) ability to manage its common borders increased, 
migration has become a top priority issue for the EU. 
 Over the last couple of years, nurtured by the Arab Spring and 
specifically as a result of the Syrian Civil War, the number of refugees trying 
to run away from Syria and some other countries located mostly in the war 
torn regions of the Middle East and Africa have increased dramatically 
leading to a refugee crisis. This increase in the number of refugees have 
reached such levels that the capacities of the neighboring countries to help 
these people have been surpassed and by the second half of 2015, increasing 
numbers of refugees have started to push the borders of the EU. In the first 
years of the crisis, these refugees were mostly being hosted by countries like 
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Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.  Especially following the brutal attacks of the 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad towards his own people, many Syrians 
have fled to Turkey. Turkey has followed an open door policy towards these 
refugees fleeing from Syria. It has established refugee camps and has hosted 
quite a number of refugees in these camps. Therefore, until 2015, the 
refugees have preferred mostly to stay in Turkey where they were welcomed 
and supported as well as Jordan and Lebanon. During this time period, the 
refugees were attracting the interest of the media and civil society in Europe. 
However; in 2015, when the flow of refugees who were trying to reach the 
EU began to increase abruptly, the EU has awakened to a refugee crisis 
(Bayraklı and Keskin, 2015: 9). 
 Currently, the management of this crisis both in the domestic and in 
the external spheres will have vital repercussions for the EU leaders, for the 
future of the EU as well as for Turkey and the countries of the region. It has 
become obvious that the best way to stop the inflow of refugees from the 
Middle Eastern and African regions to the EU is to stop civil wars and 
internal fights in those countries and to establish democratic governments 
who would respect human rights and work for the welfare of their citizens. 
However; this is far away from being a short term solution to manage the 
current refugee crisis but rather a long term one. The EU can work to bring 
peace to those regions and help to rebuild the social and economic 
atmosphere which would create the incentive for their citizens to stay or even 
return back to their own countries. This would at first require the 
establishment of safe regions for these people. However, in the short term, 
the EU has had to use a firefighting strategy to be able to cope with this 
crisis.  While domestically it has tried to come up with some practical 
policies to manage the stay of existing refugees, externally it has aimed to 
decrease the number of refugees trying to penetrate the EU from illegal 
ways. In this respect, the EU has tried to improve its cooperation with its 
neighbors at its borders to better control illegal migration. At this juncture, 
EU’s recent attempts to revitalize its relations with Turkey through the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement, Visa Liberalization Dialogue, financial 
support and opening of a new chapter in accession negotiations attract 
attention and deserve analysis. 
 This paper aims to investigate the effects of the refugee crisis on the 
EU-Turkey relations.  The refugee crisis has highlighted the importance of 
Turkey for the EU as a neighboring country. If supported, Turkey has the 
capacity as well as the will to host the refugees fleeing from Syria. Knowing 
this, the EU led by Germany has approached Turkey for the earlier 
implementation of the Readmission Agreement which has already been 
signed in December 2013 and came into effect in 2014.  In an effort to 
convince Turkey for this agreement to be implemented at an earlier date, the 
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EU has offered some incentives to Turkey in the form of financial support as 
well as earlier implementation of visa liberalization and has promised to 
open new chapters in accession negotiations. Shortly, the refugee crisis has 
led to a rapprochement between the EU and Turkey whose relations have 
shown a slow down in the last couple of years. The refugee crisis has revived 
the relations and the two parties have come together for a Readmission 
Agreement which would be supported financially and followed by visa 
liberalization.   
 In the first part of this paper, the readmission agreements as well as 
visa liberalization dialogues that the EU has concluded with other countries 
will be analyzed.  There seems to be a common understanding among a large 
part of the Turkish public that the EU has demanded readmission only from 
Turkey and that this agreement has been specifically formulated for Turkey.  
Therefore, first the nature of EU readmission agreements will be examined, 
then agreements which had already started to be implemented and those 
which are still in negotiation will be listed.  This will be done to show that 
readmission agreements are an important tool of EU migration policy, 
Turkey is not the first country to sign such a deal.   
 The relations between the EU and Turkey were under an impasse 
over the last couple of years. The Turkish public has lost its trust and faith in 
the EU to a great extent. Therefore, for many Turkish people, visa 
liberalization was just another promise that the EU might not keep anyway. 
In an effort to shed light on the worries of the Turkish side, in this paper, visa 
liberalization dialogues that have already been used as an incentive in other 
readmission agreements of the EU will be analyzed to see if they have been 
started to be implemented successfully or not. 
 In the second part of this paper, after a short overview of EU-Turkey 
relations, the recent developments in terms of the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement, the Visa Liberalization Dialogue and accession negotiations will 
be described. The paper will be finalized with an analysis of the effects of 
these developments on the EU-Turkey relations and whether these 
developments could be influential to really overcome the impasse in the 
relations. 
 
The Refugee Crisis and the EU 
 The EU’s handling of the refugees has been governed by the Dublin 
Convention. According to this Convention, an asylum seeker applies for 
asylum in the country where he/she has stepped in first. As a result of this 
rule, the refugees who have reached the EU from its southern borders by 
passing over the Mediterranean have started to increase rapidly leading to a 
reaction in the EU especially in Greece and Italy. However, soon it has 
become clearly evident that the EU did not have a working and unified 
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migration policy to manage these uncontrolled refugee flows. The Dublin 
Convention was not capable of managing or solving the current refugee 
crisis.  Therefore, the EU’s initial response to the refugee crisis has been 
incoherent.  Different member states have taken different approaches to the 
problem. Some countries have introduced border controls like Denmark’s 
decision on its borders with Germany. While Hungary has started to build a 
wall to stop the refugees, Poland has refused to accept thousands of refugees. 
As a result of these developments, the ex-President of France Nicholas 
Sarkozy has even called Schengen to be dead (Gönen, 2016). Across the EU, 
nationalism and far-right parties have started to gain increased support in 
parallel with increasing xenophobia and Islamofobia. In a way, the refugee 
crisis has turned out to be a domestic problem in many of the member states 
as well as a crisis for the EU as a whole. In this crisis atmosphere, the EU 
has given priority to security driven concerns and interests of the EU 
member states and has tried to come up with new policies to improve border 
controls, return and readmission, and fight against smuggling. Ensuring full 
compliance with fundamental human rights standards and principles have 
stayed at the second rank. (Carrera et al, 2015) 
 In this crisis, the existing instruments to control the external borders, 
like Frontex and Triton, were not effective, either (Crisp, 2015). It has 
become clear that the EU was not able to struggle with this crisis only by 
using its existing instruments and policies. For many EU politicians and 
leaders, the EU has limits and accepting more refugees is not economically 
sustainable anymore, furthermore, it risks destroying the EU (Gotev, 2015).  
Therefore, besides initiating policy changes and taking new decisions within 
the internal borders of the EU to cope with this crisis, like relocation of 
refugees and new financial support, the EU has decided to take immediate 
action to somehow decrease and eventually stop this flow of refugees. One 
of the most important tools used by the EU to fight illegal migration has been 
the readmission agreements.  
 
The Role of Readmission Agreements within the Migration Policy of the 
EU 
 An effective return policy is a very important part of a successful 
migration policy. In an effort to manage returns, the EU tries to harmonize 
national efforts in parallel with the Return Directive1. The Return Directive 
establishes common standards and procedures for the return of irregular 
                                                            
1 DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL  of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States 
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF 
(Accessed on: 19.01.2016). 
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migrants.  This legislation is under the Schengen acquis. To make the Return 
Directive efficient, it is necessary to cooperate with the non-EU countries. 
This is being achieved by the readmission agreements (European 
Commission, 2015a). 
 The readmission agreements aim to facilitate the return of third 
country nationals to their original countries. Only illegal refugees can be 
returned and readmitted. The refugees who are under international protection 
or who are given asylum cannot be returned. In the EU, the member states 
have decided to sign readmission agreements with third countries in 1994. 
The guiding principles related to the implementation of these agreements 
were adopted in 1995. Upon the signing of a readmission agreement, the 
contracting parties accept to readmit their own nationals who are residing 
illegally on the territory of the other party or the third country nationals who 
have crossed their borders illegally to reach the territory of the other party 
(European Commission, 2015b). 
 
The European Union Readmission Agreements (EURAs) 
 The EURAs are used by the EU as a way to manage the migration 
flows into the EU member countries in an effort to fight against irregular 
immigration. They try to facilitate the return of immigrants to their own 
countries. The responsibility and competence to manage these issues have 
been given to the Commission in 1999. Since then the Council has given 
directives to the Commission to start negotiations with many countries. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, the conclusion of the EURAs is legally based on the 
Article 79(3) of Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. But it is already a 
principle of international law, although customary, that each country should 
take back its own nationals (European Commission, 2011). 
 Overall, the EURAs are important tools to fight against illegal 
migration from third countries. If right incentives are used, they can be 
successful. Generally, the EURAs help to improve human rights, enhance 
Europeanization, create new avenues to revive relations and make 
negotiations possible. With some countries, readmission negotiations take a 
very long time. With some, it is not even possible to open negotiations. The 
reasons for this are lack of incentives on the side of the EU and lack of 
flexibility on the side of the readmitting countries on technical issues. The 
negotiations with many countries have delayed due to the insistence of the 
EU on the inclusion of third country nationals within the scope of the 
agreements.  
 
Incentives Offered in Return for Readmission Agreements 
 Initially, the EU was trying to conclude these agreements without 
offering anything in return but since these agreements generally have only a 
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few benefits for the third countries, these countries ask for something in 
return. The Russian Federation and Ukraine negotiations had accelerated 
only when the EU accepted at their demand to negotiate visa facilitation 
agreements in parallel with the readmission agreements. In the case of 
Algeria and China, both countries have repeatedly asked for visa measures 
but the EU has not accepted for various reasons. The Commission 
recommends that the EU should develop four main incentives at its disposal: 
1. Various visa related tools, 2. Financial Assistance, 3. Global approach to 
migration toolbox and 4. Legal migration.  Trade related measures can also 
be used as incentives to convince a country to sign a readmission agreement 
(European Commission, 2011). 
 
Visa Facilitation and Visa Liberalization 
 At the first instance, readmission agreements and visa liberalization 
might seem to be contradicting each other. For example, if the EU aims to 
decrease the number of migrants passing to the EU territory from the Turkish 
borders, lifting the visa obligation and opening the borders for free travel 
might not sound logical.  When the borders are opened for visa free travel, 
one might expect a further increase in illegal migration. However; according 
to an official Commission Document (Commission Staff Working 
Document, 2009), the implementation of the EU visa facilitation agreements 
does not lead to a rise in irregular migration from these countries. The 
countries can still continue to control who has visa and who does not. 
Besides, visa liberalization helps that country to harmonize and standardize 
its visa policies with the policies of the EU, enhances cooperation at the 
borders, helps the intelligence services to trace smugglers and makes it 
possible to fight them cooperatively. Therefore, it has been possible for the 
EU to accept that visa liberalization agreements can provide the necessary 
incentive for readmission agreements without increasing irregular migration 
(European Commission, 2011). When the non-EU country is not appropriate 
for visa liberalization due to various reasons like political instability or lack 
of technical infrastructure, the EU uses visa facilitation agreements which 
aim to provide visa facilitation especially only to certain part of the society 
like the businessmen and academic people. 
 
Financial Assistance 
 The other incentive used by the EU to convince a country to accept 
readmission is financial assistance during the implementation of the 
agreement.  For own nationals, countries need funds to reintegrate these 
people to their society. This should be achieved so that these people will not 
need to go back to Europe again. For the third country nationals, again these 
countries need financial help to keep the returned illegal migrants in their 
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countries until they are returned to their original countries. Until then they 
should be able to stay in those countries under European standards. This has 
already been experienced where the EU has provided funds to those 
countries which had signed EURAs, in an effort to support reintegration 
policies and reception capacities of these countries. Financial assistance has 
very often been requested by various countries like Morocco, Turkey, 
Ukraine and some Western Balkan countries. The money to be provided 
comes on top of what is already programmed or promised under other 
European programs like the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
or the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. This money can 
be provided only from the Thematic Programmes for cooperation in the areas 
of migration and asylum. But it has a small budget and it covers the whole 
world. So often the EU has used the funds from the existing geographical 
programs until now (European Commission, 2011). 
 
The EURAs in force or under negotiation 
 Until the present, the Commission has negotiated EU Readmission 
Agreements with Russia, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, the 
Chinese Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao, Algeria, 
Turkey, Albania, China, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Cape 
Verde, Tunisia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Seventeen of these 
negotiations have been finalized and the readmission agreements have come 
into force including the Chinese Special Administrative Regions of Hong 
Kong and Macau, Sri Lanka, Russia, Ukraine, the Western Balkan countries, 
the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape 
Verde and Pakistan (European Commission, 2015b). 
 All these agreements constitute a part of the grand plan designed by 
the EU to secure the Schengen area by protecting external borders. The EU 
has been developing this plan since the beginning of this millennium.  
However, the refugee crisis has further shown the EU that if the EU is to 
continue to prosper peacefully, this could not be realized without the 
cooperation of its neighbours. Furthermore, this crisis has made it evident 
that Schengen was more than necessary for a successful single market that is 
the heart of the EU and cooperation on justice and home affairs was a 
requirement for Schengen to sustain into the future (Delors et al, 2016). 
 
Examples of Visa Liberalization Dialogues with Successful Outcomes 
 The EU has initiated visa liberalization dialogues with three Eastern 
Partnership countries with which it has signed Readmission Agreements; 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.  With these dialogues, the EU has aimed to 
take the necessary steps towards a long-term goal of visa free travel, 
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provided that the conditions for well managed and secure mobility are 
achieved. The Commission monitors the implementation of these Action 
Plans through regular progress reports.   
 Visa liberalization dialogues are an important and effective tool to 
help countries achieve difficult reforms in the justice and home affairs area 
due to their huge impact on areas like rule of law and justice reform. The 
Visa Liberalization Action Plans (VLAPs) are the major tools of this 
dialogue. The VLAPs are tailor-made for each partner country. They include 
four basic benchmarks to be achieved: i) document security, including 
biometrics; ii) integrated border management, migration management, 
asylum; iii) public order and security; and iv) external relations and 
fundamental rights. Based on these benchmarks, the adoption of the 
legislative, policy and institutional frameworks constitutes the ‘phase 1’ 
while ensuring the effective and sustainable implementation constitutes the 
‘phase 2’ (European Commission, 2015c). 
 
Visa Liberalization Dialogues with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia  
 The EU-Republic of Moldova Visa Liberalization Dialogue was 
launched on 15 June 2010. The first Progress Report was published in 
September 2011, the second one on February 2012, the third one in June 
2012, the fourth in June 2013, the fifth and the final one was published in 
November 2013. Based on Moldova’s successful implementation of all the 
benchmarks of its VLAP, the Commission has proposed the visa free travel 
of Moldovan citizens to the Schengen area on 27 November 2013. As of 28 
April 2014, visa obligation of the Moldovan citizens to travel to the 
Schengen zone has been abolished (European Commission, 2015c). 
 The EU-Ukraine Visa Liberalization Dialogue was initiated on 28 
October 2008 and VLAP was presented to Ukraine on 22 November 2010.  
The first Progress Report was published in September 2011, the second in 
February 2012 and the third one in November 2013.  On 18 December 2015, 
the European Commission announced that Ukraine has met all of its criteria 
for visa liberalization and in parallel has adopted the sixth and last progress 
report related to Ukraine’s implementation of its VLAP. The next step for 
the Commission will be to propose to the Council and the European 
Parliament the lifting of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens with 
biometric passports (European Commission Press Release, 2015a). 
 With Georgia, the same dialogue was launched on June 2012 and 
VLAP was presented on 25 February 2013. The first Progress Report was 
published in November 2013, the second in October 2014 and the third in 
May 2015. On 18 December 2015, the European Commission announced 
that Georgia has met all the benchmarks required to be fulfilled in its VLAP. 
Therefore, the Commission will propose in early 2016 to the Council and the 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
22 
European Parliament to lift the visa requirements for the Georgian citizens 
with biometric travel documents (European Commission, 2015d).  
 
Visa Liberalization Dialogues with the EU Candidate and Potential 
Candidate Countries 
 As of December 2009, the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have been able to travel visa free to 
the Schengen area.2  Citizens of Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina have also 
achieved visa free travel since December 20103. This has served as a very 
important incentive for these countries to fasten up their reform efforts and 
advance their accession processes. The EU is continuing to monitor the 
sustainability of the visa free travel of the citizens of these countries through 
a post-visa liberalization monitoring mechanism. The EU has also initiated a 
visa liberalization dialogue with Kosovo on 19 January 2012 and its related 
roadmap was given on 14 June 2012. The first Progress Report on Kosovo’s 
implementation of the requirements of the roadmap was published in 
February 2013 and the second one in July 2014 (European Commission, 
2015e). Concerning Kosovo, the European Commission has published 
Kosovo’s third and final Progress Report related to visa liberalization. The 
Commission has concluded that there are only eight requirements remained 
by Kosovo to be fulfilled.  As soon as Kosovo fulfills these, the Commission 
will propose the lifting of visa obligations (European Commission, 2015f). 
 These few examples show that the EU has been using the 
readmission agreements as part of its migration policy for the last couple of 
years. These examples are very important to show how visa facilitation 
agreements are being used by the EU as an incentive for the realization of 
readmission agreements. The successful realization of visa liberalization 
with some of these countries prove that the EU has the capacity to put 
promises into action. 
 After describing the importance of the readmission agreements for 
the EU and giving some examples of such agreements with visa 
liberalization outcomes, the following section aims to examine the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement as well as the Visa Liberalization Dialogue 
as being an important incentive tied to the successful implementation of this 
Agreement. Consequently, the effects of this Agreement and the refugee 
crisis on EU-Turkey relations will be analyzed. 
 
 
                                                            
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. 
3 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-548_en.htm?locale=en (Accessed on 
17.01.2016). 
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A Short Overview of EU-Turkey Relations 
 Turkey has applied for membership to the European Economic 
Community in 1959. The Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) 
between the two parties was signed in 1963. 1970s and the beginning of 80s 
had been tough years for Turkey both economically and politically. Starting 
from the second half of 80s onwards, Turkey has worked to liberalize its 
economy and strengthen its democracy.  In 1996, the EU-Turkey Customs 
Union Agreement came into force. In December 1999 at the Helsinki 
Summit, Turkey’s official candidacy status was given. When Turkey was 
able to meet the Copenhagen Criteria in 2004, accession negotiations was 
finally opened on 3 October 2005. The first chapter was opened for 
negotiations in 2006 and on the same day it has been provisionally closed.  
However, this new era in the relations between the EU and Turkey has 
immediately been shadowed when Turkey was asked to put into force the 
Additional Protocol which would update the Ankara Agreement by including 
the new ten members of the EU who had become members during the 
enlargement of 2004.  Within these countries Southern Cyprus was also 
included as one of the new members of the EU, however; Southern Cyprus 
was not being recognized by Turkey due to the divided status of the island. 
The EU Council warned Turkey in 2005 to implement the Protocol and 
realize its responsibilities emanating from this Protocol by opening Turkish 
ports and airports to the ships and planes of Southern Cyprus. When Turkey 
has not taken any steps in this direction, in December 2006, the EU Council 
announced that eight chapters in the accession negotiations were blocked that 
they would not be opened for negotiations until Turkey abides by its 
responsibilities under the Protocol and that no chapter would be 
provisionally closed. In a nutshell, Turkey’s implementation of the 
Additional Protocol has become an opening benchmark for eight chapters 
while it has become a closing benchmark for all the chapters. In spite of 
these restrictions, accession negotiations have continued and in 2007 five 
more chapters, in 2008 four more, in 2009 two more, in 2010 one more 
chapter and lastly this year one more chapter have been opened to 
negotiations knowing that none of them could be closed not even 
provisionally.  
 Another restriction on the opening of new chapters has come from 
France. The then French President Nicholas Sarkozy, opposing the full 
membership of Turkey to the EU, proposed a ‘privileged partnership’ for 
Turkey instead of full membership. Therefore, in an effort to prevent 
Turkey’s full membership, France blocked the opening of five additional 
chapters to negotiations in 2007 which were related to full membership. In 
addition to these, six more chapters have been blocked by Southern Cyprus 
in 2009.  Between 2010 and 2013, the EU has become preoccupied with the 
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financial crisis and the accession negotiations have stalled. 2013 has been a 
year that has witnessed a revival of relations. With the new French President 
François Hollande, it has been possible to open one of the chapters (Chapter 
22 Regional Policy) that had been previously blocked by France. Again in 
2013, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement has been signed with the 
promise of visa liberalization for the Turkish citizens. However; in the 
following months, the relations have slowed down again. During this period, 
Euroscepticism in both parties have increased and they have drifted further 
apart from each other. 
 It was within this atmosphere that in 2015, the refugee crisis has led 
to the opening of a new period in EU-Turkey relations. It is possible to argue 
that the refugee crisis has made the EU to remember the importance of its 
relations with Turkey and led to a rapprochement in relations. While the EU 
was in need of Turkish support to stop the flow of refugees to the EU, 
Turkey was willing to revitalize its accession negotiations. This has helped 
the parties to compromise. On 29 November 2015, the parties have come 
together for a summit which has been the culmination of this compromise. 
The EU has accepted to open up new chapters to revive the relations together 
with some other incentives which will be discussed below and Turkey has 
accepted to cooperate with the EU to stop the refugee flows to Europe. Based 
on this compromise, on 14 December 2015, Chapter 17 (Economic and 
Monetary Policy) has been opened to negotiations which was again 
previously blocked by France. However; the success of this rapprochement is 
based on the performance of the parties in keeping their promises.  
 Until the beginning of 2016, in the EU-Turkey accession 
negotiations, 15 chapters out of 35 have been opened to negotiations. The 
negotiations to open 9 chapters are continuing in the European Council. 
Among these, the Chapter on justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24) 
covers migration, asylum, visa policy, external borders, Schengen, judicial 
cooperation in criminal and civil matters, police cooperation, fight against 
organized crime, terrorism, drugs, customs cooperation and counterfeiting of 
the euro. Even though, accession negotiations have not started on this 
chapter, the EU regularly monitors Turkey’s achievements with respect to 
this chapter through the annual progress reports. The EU also supports 
Turkey’s actions related to this field through the instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). Although Chapter 24 is directly related to the 
recent migration problems, it does not seem possible to open this chapter 
because of the veto of Southern Cyprus. 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
25 
The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and the Visa Liberalization 
Dialogue (16 December 2013) 
 The Council has adopted a decision to initiate negotiations for a EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement on 28 November 2002. Negotiations were 
formally opened on 27 May 2005. Several rounds of negotiations have taken 
place between the two parties. The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement has 
been signed on 16 December 2013 and at the same time the Visa 
Liberalization Dialogue has been initiated. The readmission obligations 
under this agreement are reciprocal, these obligations comprise illegal 
migrants who are own nationals as well as third country nationals and 
stateless persons (European Commission, 2013a), (European Commission, 
2013b). 
 
The Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime 
 Although Chapter 24 Justice Freedom and Security has not been 
opened for accession negotiations yet, on 16 December 2013, the EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement has been signed and a visa liberalization dialogue 
has been started. Based on this dialogue, a roadmap4 towards visa-free 
regime with Turkey has been prepared. This roadmap lists the reforms or 
areas to be developed and policies to be implemented by Turkey. 
Accordingly, the Commission will be publishing Progress Reports to 
evaluate Turkey’s performance related to these benchmarks and the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council will assess the progress made by Turkey every six 
months. When Turkey fulfils the requirements of the roadmap, the 
Commission will present its proposal to the European Parliament and the 
Council to lift the visa obligation for Turkish citizens who hold biometric 
travel documents. Then, the European Parliament and the Council shall make 
a decision in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure based on 
Article 77 (2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The first report 
on Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the requirements of the visa roadmap has 
been published in October 2014 (European Commission, 2015e).  
 The roadmap identifies the necessary legislation and administrative 
reforms that Turkey should achieve to establish a secure environment for 
visa-free travel to the Schengen area. It brings four basic benchmarks, almost 
the same with those of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. These benchmarks 
are: 1. Documents security, 2. Migration and border management, 3. Public 
order and security and 4. Fundamental rights. The Roadmap also includes the 
                                                            
4 For the document, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-
free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf (Accessed on 17.01.2016). 
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readmission of illegal migrants. In the official document, it has been 
emphasized that: 
This dialogue is tailor-made to allow Turkey to focus its reform 
efforts and fulfil the EU’s requirements. The pace of movement 
towards visa liberalization will depend on Turkey’s progress in 
adopting and implementing the measures and fulfilling the 
requirements set out in this Roadmap, including full and effective 
implementation of the readmission agreement and effective 
cooperation vis-à-vis all EU Member States on JHA issues as these 
issues are outlined in the present roadmap (European Commission, 
2013b). 
 An exact date has not been given for visa liberalization but rather its 
finalization has been based on Turkey’s performance in implementing the 
readmission agreement, fulfilling the other benchmarks in the roadmap and 
cooperating effectively with all the EU member states on JHA issues.  
 Following these developments, relations has really slowed down as 
Euroscepticism both in the EU member states and in Turkey have risen. 
Upon this background, the Summit that has been realized on 29 November 
2015 can be seen as an important date in EU-Turkey relations symbolizing a 
rapprochement. It is quite evident that the push factor leading to this 
rapprochement has been the refugee crisis and consequently the emergence 
of Turkey as a vital actor in EU’s struggle with this crisis. 
 Within the emergency plan of the EU to cope with this crisis, the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement had an important place. The reason for this 
is that more than two million people running away from the conflict in Syria 
have been hosted by Turkey. In 2015, around 750.000 of these people, 
including asylum seekers and economic migrants, have reached Europe over 
Turkey. (European Commission Press Release, 2015b). If they are not 
stopped, this number can easily and very quickly rise further up. 
 It was within this atmosphere that the EU has offered Turkey to draw 
back the dates of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement that was signed in 
2013. To convince Turkey in this respect, the EU has used both the visa and 
the financial support incentives as well as revitalization of the accession 
negotiations through the promises of opening new chapters. 
  
The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan – 15 October 2015 
 The EU-Turkey action plan accepted on 15 October 2015 aims to 
establish collaboration between EU and Turkey to supplement Turkey’s 
efforts to manage the influx of Syrian refugees in need of temporary 
protection. This action tried to create an understanding of burden sharing. 
This plan also included the other commitments of both parties like visa 
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liberalization dialogue for Turkey (European Commission Press Release, 
2015c). 
 In the first part of the plan the EU aims to support the Syrians under 
temporary protection and their Turkish hosting communities. The EU 
appreciates Turkey’s efforts and emphasizes that Turkey has been hosting 
almost about 2.2 Syrian refugees since conflict in Syria has emerged and that 
Turkey has already spent around €7 billion of its own resources to address 
this crisis (European Commission Press Release, 2015c). 
 Under this joint action plan, the EU has intended to mobilize new 
funds outside the IPA funds that is planned to be allocated to Turkey, to help 
Turkey cope with the refugees, most notably through the EU Trust Fund for 
the Syrian crisis. Turkey has intended to effectively implement the law on 
foreigners and international protection by adopting secondary legislation, 
make sure that the migrants are registered, have access to public services like 
education, health and participation in the economy. On the second part of the 
plan, strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration is emphasized. 
Besides, the visa liberalization dialogue, the visa roadmap and the provisions 
of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement have been described (European 
Commission Press Release, 2015c).  
 
EU-Turkey Summit – 29 November 2015 
 The Commission presented this Joint Action Plan to the Council on 
15 October 2015. The Council endorsed this plan and convened an EU-
Turkey Summit on 29 November 2015. This Summit has activated the 
Action Plan and re-energized the EU-Turkey relations. At this Summit, the 
EU has committed itself to increasing political engagement with Turkey, 
providing significant financial support to Turkey, accelerate the fulfilment of 
the visa liberalization roadmap and re-energize the accession process 
(European Council, 2015). 
 In this Summit, both the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and the 
Visa Liberalization Dialogue have been updated to be finalized at an earlier 
date. Under the new circumstances, the Readmission Agreement is aimed to 
be implemented in June 2016 and accordingly visa obligations of Turkish 
citizens is to be lifted by October 2016 if Turkey has fulfilled its 
responsibilities related to the Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime by that 
time. Besides, the EU has promised Turkey to provide €3 billion financial 
support for readmission activities covering both its nationals as well as third 
country nationals especially Syrians. Last but not least, a new chapter, 
previously blocked by France, has been decided to be opened to negotiations. 
This was realized on 14 December 2015 by the opening of Chapter 17 on 
Economic and Monetary Policy to negotiations. The opening of a new 
chapter after almost two years as well as the Summit with the promises of 
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visa free travel to the Schengen area and financial support in the name of 
burden sharing have revitalized the relations between the EU and Turkey and 
have created momentum for the stalled accession negotiations. Besides, it 
has been noted that the EU Commission was committed to achieving the 
preparatory works for the opening of a number of chapters without prejudice 
to the position of the member states (European Council, 2015). 
 In the joint statement that parties have made after this summit, it was 
emphasized that they were “determined to confront and surmount the 
existing risks and threats in a concerted manner to reinforce the European 
Project” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2015). It was accepted that 
Turkey’s accession negotiations should be re-energized. To explore the vast 
potential of EU-Turkey relations, more frequent high-level dialogue was 
necessary, therefore, they have agreed on two regular summits a year which 
would make it possible to assess the developments of relations. In addition to 
all these, a high level economic dialogue is also planned to be launched in 
the first quarter of 2016 to improve economic and business relations. The 
parties have agreed to hold the second meeting of High Level Energy 
Dialogue and Strategic Energy Cooperation again in the first quarter of 2016. 
The launch of negotiations to upgrade the Customs Union towards the end of 
2016 has also been planned (General Secretariat of the Council, 2015). This 
has also become a very important topic within the EU-Turkey relations. 
Based on the structure of the existing EU-Turkey Customs Union 
Agreement, Turkey stays out of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) aimed to be signed between the EU and the United States 
(US) for the establishment of a huge free market. Due to the nature of the 
existing Customs Union, Turkey is required to open its customs to the US 
under the mandate of the TTIP, however; the US is not required to do the 
same thing in return. This leaves Turkey at a disadvantage. As a result, 
Turkey aims to overcome this situation on an equitable basis by a revision of 
the existing Customs Union Agreement (Bal, 2014). 
 “A multi-tier and/or multi-speed Europe seems to emerging de facto 
in the EU” (Eralp, 2014:7). Within the new flexibility formulations for the 
future of the EU, Turkey might be able to find a place for itself within the 
EU. But this can be achieved if the existing vetoes on some of the chapters of 
the accession negotiations can be overcome so that the negotiations can be 
continued on a normalized and just accession path way. Therefore, even 
though the recent developments establish the basis of a rapprochement 
between the EU and Turkey, the success of this new period depends on its 
capacity to normalize the relations between the two parties by overcoming 
the impasse, eliminating the vetoes and enhancing the accession process. 
Otherwise, this rapprochement can only symbolize a small parenthesis within 
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the problematic relationship between the EU and Turkey with the impasse 
continuing into the future and cutting all the efforts for mutual cooperation. 
 For the relations to continue into the future in a positive way, there 
are important responsibilities for both parties. First of all, Turkey should 
fulfil its obligations emanating from the recent agreements. In parallel with 
this, the EU should also keep its promises both in terms of financial support 
and visa liberalization. Many people in Turkey do not believe in the EU’s 
promise of abolishing visa for the Turkish citizens. Rather, they argue that 
the most that the EU can achieve for Turkey could be visa facilitation but not 
liberalization. Looking back at the EU-Turkey relations in the past, many 
Turkish people argue that the EU is not trustable, that it uses double 
standards and it can easily break its promises by creating new obstacles. If 
the same thing happens related to the promises of either financial support or 
visa liberalization, in other words if the EU does not keep its promises duly, 
the relations between the two parties might become even worse.  
 The recent economic and political developments in the region and in 
the world have reminded both parties of their importance for each other. The 
developments in the Middle East specifically in Syria and the refugee crisis, 
the terrorist attacks and the threats of terrorists crossing the EU borders, a 
more assertive Russia, the new energy resources in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Africa, the EU’s energy security issues and Turkey’s 
strategic location in this respect, the still continuing economic crisis in the 
EU, the EU’s weakening place in the global markets and its competition with 
the rising economies of the world are just few factors behind the reason why 
both parties have remembered how they were actually important for each 
other. Presently, it has become possible to argue that the world politics is 
striving for a new balance both at the international and regional levels. In this 
new balance, both the EU and Turkey need each other just like they have 
needed each other right after the Second World War when a new balance 
was being established. 
 In this respect, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and together 
with it, the promise of visa liberalization, financial support and opening of 
new chapters in the accession negotiations might be seen as a tipping point in 
their relationship. Based on the outcomes of these bilateral promises, in other 
words according to whether they will be kept or not, the relationship will 
either improve very quickly to the favor of both parties or the impasse will 
deepen further with increasing lack of trust as the parties will drift apart from 
each other which will not be beneficial for both of them. 
 Looking at the previous examples of readmission agreements that the 
EU has signed and the visa liberalization dialogues it has initiated and 
finalized, there is enough evidence and hope for Turkey and the Turkish 
people believe in the realization of visa travel to the EU. Put on top of this 
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the opening of new chapters and financial support which would then 
constitute the beginning of a new era in the relations between the EU and 
Turkey nurtured by trust. 
 
Analysis and expectations 
 The developments in the Middle Eastern region starting with the 
Arab Spring have led Turkey to emerge as a very important actor. From 
Turkey's point of view, the increasing instability in the region together with 
Turkey's increasing isolation have led Turkey to rethink about its relations 
with the EU (Eralp, 2014). For the EU, Turkey is located at a very strategic 
place between the EU and the instable region. Therefore, both parties have 
favored rapprochement. The important point lies at the juncture whether this 
rapprochement will be able to overcome the long standing impasse in the 
relations or not. If the impasse in the relations resulting from Turkey’s not 
implementing the requirements of the Additional Protocol concerning 
Southern Cyprus and the EU’s vetoes to impede the accession negotiations 
are not eliminated, then this rapprochement is doomed to be very short lived. 
At the present, the underlying factors concerning the impasse have not 
disappeared yet. As long as the vetoes continue on the accession 
negotiations, opening of one or two chapters, although good news, does not 
mean much. Besides, there is a serious credibility problem. Many Turkish 
people have lost their belief in Turkey’s membership. They do not foresee 
full membership. They do not trust the EU as a partner and they think that 
Turkey is being seduced by the EU through the promises that will never be 
realized or kept. The fact that the EU-Turkey accession negotiations can 
easily be blocked by the wish of a single country frustrates the Turkish 
people and creates negative sentiments about the EU. Turkish people find it 
difficult to understand how the EU member states accept to be dictated by 
the specific wishes of a single country and none of them oppose this (Eralp, 
2014). Therefore, this rapprochement can really mean something if it leads to 
an era of trust and cooperation for mutual benefits between the parties. 
 A recent example might be sufficient to explain the credibility 
problem. Chapter 17 (Economic and Monetary Policy) has been opened to 
negotiations on 14 December 2015 as part of the promises made by the EU 
concerning the refugee crisis. In fact, the EU has decided to open this chapter 
to negotiations and has invited Turkey with an official letter from the 
German Presidency of the EU in 2007, to submit its Document related to its 
negotiation position. Turkey has submitted its position in March 2007. 
However; France has decided to block the opening of this chapter after 
Turkey’s submission. This has demonstrated clearly that the official letters of 
the EU Presidency as well as the unanimous decisions of the EU can easily 
be nullified by one single country (Eralp, 2014: 5). On Turkey’s side, this 
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has had the effect of decreasing confidence in the EU, strengthening the 
belief that the EU might not hold its promises. Upon this development that 
has taken place in 2007, the opening of Chapter 17 to negotiations has been a 
positive step forward, however; it is not enough to overcome the EU’s long 
standing credibility problem in Turkey.  
 In this respect, the successful finalization of the EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement and visa liberalization would be very important 
achievements for the EU-Turkey relations in terms of reestablishing trust 
among the parties. However; these topics are the contents of Chapter 23 on 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and 
Security which are closely related to readmission and visa freedom. 
Unfortunately, these two related chapters are presently blocked under the 
veto of Southern Cyprus. This means that even though a new era has begun 
between the EU and Turkey with cooperation on a new avenue, as long as 
the vetoes continue, it is not possible to proceed in this new avenue with a 
future vision aimed at finalizing negotiations and closing these chapters. 
Given that the existing vetoes continue, these developments then; the 
readmission agreement, the visa liberalization and the opening of a new 
chapter, cannot have much contribution for the future of Turkey’s 
membership in the EU. They rather seem to be a part of the firefighting 
strategy of the EU to stop the refugee flows to Europe. 
 Actually, this rapprochement represents a very important and 
historical point in time since the needs of both parties have coincided to 
produce compromise in problematic areas. If these problematic areas can be 
solved within this limited time by the good will and credible actions of both 
parties, this rapprochement can really become the beginning of a new era 
between the EU and Turkey. 
 Under these circumstances, for the vetoes to be eliminated; either the 
Cyprus problem should be resolved very fast to open up the way forward for 
Turkey in its relations with the EU or other ways or formulas should be 
developed to overcome these vetoes and make Turkey’s accession possible. 
Finally, a clear plan or a timetable should be presented to Turkey that can 
motivate it for further reform and cooperation with the EU. For all these to 
be realized, there is a great need of trust in the relationship. The new seeds of 
partnership based on the recent conjuncture should be built around 
compromise to establish a new atmosphere and to start a new phase in the 
bilateral relations. The recent developments in the region and in the world 
show that the two parties will be in need of each other in an increasing scale 
in the years to come and it is now the time to reestablish this relationship free 
from the imperfections of the past with a strong emphasis for a successful 
future cooperation.  
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
32 
 In the history of the EU, it has been possible to witness that the 
European countries have been able to integrate faster when they have 
confronted a common threat. European integration has almost been the 
outcome of uniting against common threats. It is possible to see the same 
pattern when it comes to the EU’s relations with Turkey. Faced with 
common threats, parties might find it mutually more beneficial to deepen 
relations and integrate further.  
 
Conclusion 
 During the post Second World War era, Turkey has established its 
relations with the West based on the communist threat. The West has offered 
economic and security support to Turkey with the Marshall Plan and 
membership in NATO within the structure of its containment policy towards 
communism. Turkey’s relations with Europe has been shaped within this 
understanding. Presently, migration has become a top policy issue, especially 
in 2015, and it seems like it will continue to be so in the near future. Under 
this circumstance, the EU seems to be in an effort to improve its relations 
with Turkey on the basis of containing the refugees flowing from Syria and 
the Middle East to Europe. Turkey once more has become a very important 
ally for the EU due to its strategic location in the refugee crisis.  
 The refugee crisis has put an immense pressure on EU’s Schengen 
policy. Schengen is one of the greatest achievements of the EU that supports 
the single market. Losing Schengen would greatly damage the single market 
which is at the heart of the European project. Therefore; stopping the 
refugees who are threatening Schengen and the single market is a vital need 
for the EU.  
 This said, the refugee crisis has led to a rapprochement between 
Turkey and the EU. The EU has remembered once more the important 
strategic place of Turkey for Europe. On the other hand, Turkey has gotten 
the opportunity to test the EU once again whether their relationship can 
recover and develop in the future. This very important time period might 
lead to the flourishing of cooperation between Turkey and the EU or it might 
end up with an even deeper impasse drifting the parties further away from 
each other. Therefore, it is very important for Turkey to implement the 
Readmission Agreement fully and for the EU to keep its promises duly. If 
the EU does not keep its promises, then Turkey might stop implementing the 
Readmission Agreement or vice versa, if Turkey does not implement the 
Readmission Agreement, then the EU might not keep its promises. Both 
ways would end this rapprochement which would be to the disadvantage of 
both parties. If the EU can prove that its plans for Turkey are for a longer 
term cooperation, a productive era in the relations might start which can be 
mutually beneficial. The refugee crisis has clearly shown the EU leaders that 
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the future of the EU cannot be thought of without the cooperation with 
Turkey. As for Turkey, optimism about the possible outcomes of recent 
developments should continue on a cautious basis and EU’s promises should 
not be taken for granted.   
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